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CALLING A TRUCE TO THE CRYPTO WARS: WHY 
CONGRESS AND TECH COMPANIES MUST WORK 
TOGETHER TO INTRODUCE NEW SOLUTIONS AND 
LEGISLATION TO REGULATE ENCRYPTION 
Liz Kaminski* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On December 2, 2015 at 10:59 A.M., Syed Rizwan Farook and his wife, 
Tashfeen Malik, entered a conference room at the Inland Regional Center in 
San Bernardino, California and opened fire.1  By the end of the attack, 
Farook and his wife murdered fourteen people and left twenty-two people 
seriously injured.2  Both attackers died during a gunfight with authorities 
after being pursued for the brutal assault.3  Then considered “the third 
deadliest attack on U.S. soil since Sept. 11, 2001,” law enforcement, 
unsurprisingly, began an immediate investigation into the mass shooting.4 
During the course of the investigation, law enforcement recovered three 
cellphones used by the assailants.5  Only one cellphone remained intact, an 
Apple iPhone 5C provided to Farook from his employer, the San Bernardino 
County Department of Health.6  Apple’s encryption technology, however, 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2018, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., St. Thomas Aquinas 
College.  I would like to thank my adviser to this comment Professor David Opderbeck, and 
the entire Seton Hall Law Review editorial team for their feedback and comments. 
 1  Sari Horwitz & Joel Achenbach, Report Offers New Details on San Bernardino 
Terrorist Attack, WASH. POST (Sept. 9, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nati
onal-security/report-offers-new-details-on-san-bernardino-terrorist-attack/2016/09/09/599ea
266-76be-11e6-b786-19d0cb1ed06c_story.html. 
 2  Id. 
 3  Id. 
 4  Id.  Unfortunately, terrorism and mass shootings have continued since the writing of 
this article.  Therefore, the ranking of the San Bernardino shooting may not be accurate 
considering recent events.  See, e.g., Geoffrey Mohan, The Trigonometry of Terror: Why the 
Las Vegas Shooting Was so Deadly, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/
nation/la-las-vegas-shooting-live-updates-the-trigonometry-of-terror-why-the-las-15070857
72-htmlstory.html. 
 5  Apple-FBI Battle over San Bernardino Terror Attack Investigation: All the Details, 
L.A. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tn-apple-fbi-
20160219-htmlstory.html. 
 6  Id. 
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protected the information contained in the iPhone.7  Unable to circumvent 
the security measures protecting Farook’s iPhone, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigations (FBI) turned to Apple for assistance in unlocking the phone.8  
After about a month of meetings, discussions between Apple and the FBI 
broke down.9  Once talks between the two parties collapsed, Magistrate 
Judge Sheri Pym of the District of Central California ordered Apple to assist 
the FBI in unlocking the phone on February 16, 2016.10  Judge Pym issued 
the order pursuant to the All Writs Act (AWA).11  This Act allows federal 
courts to issue “all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective 
jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.”12  
Specifically, the order detailed that Apple should provide the FBI with 
“reasonable technical assistance” to bypass Farook’s encrypted iPhone.13 
Apple issued a letter in response to Judge Pym’s order that very same 
day.14  Apple openly opposed the order claiming that forced compliance 
would set a “dangerous precedent” for data security.15  Referring to 
“technical assistance,” Apple stated, “[b]uilding a version of iOS that 
bypasses security in this way would undeniably create a backdoor.  And 
while the government may argue that its use would be limited to this case, 
there is no way to guarantee such control.”16 
 
 
 
 
 7  Raoul Rañoa & Paresh Dave, How the iPhone’s Security Measures Work, L.A. TIMES 
(Feb. 24, 2016, 1:40 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-g-how-the-iphone-s-security-
measures-work-20160219-htmlstory.html. 
 8  Eric Lichtblau & Katie Benner, Apple Fights Order to Unlock San Bernardino 
Gunman’s iPhone, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/18/techno
logy/apple-timothy-cook-fbi-san-bernardino.html?_r=1. 
 9  Id. 
 10  Eric Lichtblau, Judge Tells Apple to Help Unlock iPhone Used by San Bernardino 
Gunman, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/17/us/judge-tells-
apple-to-help-unlock-san-bernardino-gunmans-iphone.html.   
 11  28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2012). 
 12  See In re An Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant on a 
Black Lexus IS300, No. ED 15-0451M, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20543 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 
2016). 
 13  The Central District of California ordered Apple’s reasonable technical assistance in 
three respects: (1) bypassing the auto-erase function on the iPhone; (2) enabling the FBI to 
submit passcodes to the iPhone; and (3) ensuring that the FBI would not be delayed by any 
wait times between submitting passcodes.  In re An Apple iPhone, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
20543, at *2–3. 
 14  A Message to Our Customers, APPLE (Feb. 16, 2016), http://www.apple.com/cus
tomer-letter/ (last visited Jan. 13, 2017). 
 15  Id. 
 16  Id. 
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Apple’s opposition reignited a debate within the United States 
regarding encryption.17  On the one hand, law enforcement faces increasing 
investigative challenges due to sophisticated encryption protections.  On the 
other, private tech companies feel a responsibility to their users to provide 
security in addition to privacy.  This innate conflict between law 
enforcement’s ability to investigate and tech companies’ promises of user 
privacy has led to a standoff between law enforcement and private tech 
companies. 
This Comment will discuss the renewed “crypto war”—the debate 
surrounding technology companies’ role in aiding law enforcement to obtain 
information from encrypted devices.18  Part II will begin by exploring the 
recent legal battles between Apple and the FBI as a case study of this conflict 
between private, third-party companies that produce encryption and United 
States law enforcement.  Part III will then discuss the background of 
cryptology (or cryptography) and the controversy that has continuously 
surrounded private use of cryptology within the United States.  Next, Part IV 
will consider the current legislation relied upon by tech companies and the 
government, and will analyze its applicability to today’s encryption 
technology.  Part V will then propose a possible solution—a commission 
comprised of tech industry specialists, law enforcement, and other 
government officials.  Further, this Comment will present Israel as a case 
study that the United States could possibly use as a model for encryption 
regulations.  Finally, this Comment concludes that a compromise between 
law enforcement and private tech companies must be fostered in order to end 
the “crypto wars” and create new legislation to regulate encryption. 
II.   APPLE VS. FBI: LEGAL BATTLES OVER COMPELLING PRIVATE, THIRD 
PARTIES TO DECRYPT PRIVATE DEVICES 
The recent legal battles between the FBI and Apple demonstrate the 
struggles that the courts face in balancing law enforcement’s need for 
information and the private tech industry’s need for ever-increasing 
encryption security for individuals.  For instance, Apple’s refusal to comply 
with Judge Pym’s order to unlock Farook’s iPhone made news headlines 
 
 17  For an introductory discussion of the United States’s earlier “crypto wars,” see Andrea 
Peterson, The ‘Crypto Wars’ of the 1990s Are Brewing Again in Washington, WASH. POST 
(Sept. 10, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2015/09/10/the-cry
pto-wars-of-the-1990s-are-brewing-again-in-washington/. 
 18  The Fifth Amendment controversy surrounding law enforcement compelling 
individual defendants to provide their password to decrypt protected information is beyond 
the scope of this Comment.  For a discussion involving the Fifth Amendment implications in 
requiring defendants to provide their passwords for decryption, see, J. Riley Atwood, 
Comment, The Encryption Problem: Why the Courts and Technology Are Creating a Mess 
for Law Enforcement, 34 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 407 (2015). 
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during February 2016.19  Apple insisted that the court-compelled technical 
assistance would create a “backdoor” in all Apple devices running similar 
software.20  To comply with Judge Pym’s order, Apple needed to create and 
install new “bad” code on Farook’s iPhone to override the phone’s current 
“good” code.21  The “good” code improves security measures on the device 
while the “bad” code diminishes or creates vulnerabilities in the security 
measures on a device.22  By updating the iPhone’s operating system with 
“bad” code, the current security system23 would become vulnerable, 
allowing the FBI to successfully retrieve information from Farook’s 
encrypted iPhone.24  Under this premise, Apple appealed Judge Pym’s order 
compelling technical assistance on the high-profile Farook matter.25 
Another Apple legal battle also grabbed headlines during winter 2016.26  
On February 29, 2016, Judge Orenstein in the Eastern District of New York 
ruled against the government’s motion to force Apple to extract information 
from a drug dealer’s encrypted iPhone 5S, protected with a passcode.27  
Judge Orenstein, who issued the ruling In re Order Requiring Apple, Inc. to 
Assist, agreed with Apple’s argument that the AWA improperly applied to 
 
 19  See, e.g., Apple-FBI Battle over San Bernardino Terror Attack Investigation: All the 
Details, supra note 5. 
 20  See A Message to Our Customers, supra note 14.  Although Apple referred to the San 
Bernardino technical assistance order as forcing the company to create a “backdoor,” this in 
a technical sense is not correct.  A technical backdoor is when a manufacturer pre-equips 
software or hardware with code that allows the manufacturer to access the information from 
the device without the user’s permission.  See Stephanie K. Pell, You Can’t Always Get What 
You Want: How Will Law Enforcement Get What it Needs in a Post-CALEA, Cybersecurity-
Centric Encryption Era?, 17 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 599, 609–10 (2016). 
 21  See Pell, supra note 20, at 613. 
 22  Id. 
 23  Apple’s passcode feature provides iPhone users with the ability to protect information 
using 256-bit encryption. See Rañoa & Dave, supra note 7.  This encryption method produces 
trillions of possible patterns.  Id.  Further, Apple provides users with a choice to completely 
erase information found on the iPhone after several failed attempts to unlock the passcode.  
Id. 
 24  iPhones have the inability to distinguish between “good code” and “bad code.”  See 
Pell, supra note 20, at 613. 
 25  Jonathan Chew, This Is Apple’s Next Move in its Fight with the FBI, FORTUNE (Mar. 
2, 2016, 10:53 AM), http://fortune.com/2016/03/02/apple-appeal-fbi-iphone/.  
 26  See, e.g., Sarah Jeong, Judge James Orenstein Has Something to Say About the US 
Government’s Decryption of iPhones, VICE: NEWS (Mar. 1, 2016, 3:30 PM), https://news.vic
e.com/article/judge-james-orenstein-has-something-to-say-about-the-us-governments-decry
ption-of-iphones.  
 27  In re Order Requiring Apple, Inc. to Assist in the Execution of a Search Warrant Issued 
by this Court, 149 F. Supp. 3d 341, 354–55 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) [hereinafter, N.Y. Apple iPhone 
Case].  Katie Benner & Joseph Goldstein, Apple Wins Ruling in New York iPhone Hacking 
Order, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 29, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/01/technology/apple-
wins-ruling-in-new-york-iphone-hacking-order.html?_r=1.  As of July 2016, the DOJ is 
appealing Judge Orenstein’s decision.  DOJ Continues Appeal for iPhone Data Case in New 
York, FORTUNE (Apr. 8, 2016), EBSCOhost (last visited Sept. 16, 2016). 
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compelling a private tech company in assisting law enforcement.28  Apple, 
therefore, could not be compelled under this Act to provide technical 
assistance in unlocking the device.29  This decision marked a major 
divergence from earlier decisions because no other court had ruled in favor 
of Apple over law enforcement’s use of the AWA.30 
The facts in both the San Bernardino case and the New York case bore 
two major similarities.  First, the New York case, like the San Bernardino 
case, involved an encrypted iPhone.31  Second, the government in both cases 
used the AWA as its legal basis for compelling Apple to unlock the iPhone.32  
This made In re Order Requiring Apple, Inc. to Assist a foremost victory for 
Apple, and made the FBI’s argument to compel Apple to unlock Farook’s 
iPhone under the AWA vulnerable to attack on appeal.33 
Apple, however, did not get the opportunity to attack the validity of the 
FBI’s use of the AWA regarding Farook’s iPhone.  Ultimately, the FBI 
withdrew its motion to compel Apple’s technical assistance on March 28, 
2016.34  Instead, the FBI figured out a way to circumvent the encryption 
protecting Farook’s iPhone with the help of anonymous third-party hackers 
and no longer needed Apple’s assistance.35 
The FBI revealed little information regarding the flaws in the iOS 9 
software’s security measures to Apple or the public.36  The hack used for the 
San Bernardino matter only unlocked iPhone 5Cs running the iOS 9.37  
 
 28  See Benner & Goldstein, supra note 27; see also infra Part IV.B and accompanying 
text. 
 29  See Benner & Goldstein, supra note 27; see also infra Part IV.B and accompanying 
text. 
 30  Previously, at least seventy orders compelling Apple to unlock phones had been 
issued.  See Benner, supra note 27. 
 31  Sarah Jeong, The Convoluted Logic Behind Apple’s ‘Obstruction’ of Law 
Enforcement, VICE: MOTHERBOARD (Mar. 8, 2016, 6:00 AM), http://motherboard.vice.com/
en_au/read/doj-seeks-to-overturn-new-york-iphone-case. 
 32  Id. 
 33  Id. 
 34  Kate Sheehy, FBI Breaks into San Bernardino Gunman’s iPhone, Ending Court Case, 
N.Y. POST (Mar. 28, 2016), http://nypost.com/2016/03/28/fbi-breaks-into-san-bernardino-
gunmans-iphone-ending-court-case/.  
 35  Id. 
 36  In January 2017, the FBI released heavily redacted documents in response to a lawsuit 
from USA TODAY and two other news organizations seeking information about the FBI’s 
ability to circumvent Farook’s iPhone security measures.  See Elizabeth Weise, FBI Blacks 
out Most Details on Hack of Terrorist’s iPhone, USA TODAY (Jan. 7, 2017 10:48 A.M.), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2017/01/07/fbi-iphone-terrorist-san-bernardino-s
yed-rizwan-farook-foia-lawsuit-ap-vice-usa-today/96280458/.  These documents showed 
little besides boilerplate language.  Id.  The documents did not reveal how much the FBI paid 
outside sources to hack into the iPhone or the sources. Id. 
 37  Ellen Nakashima, FBI Paid Professional Hackers One-Time Fee to Crack San 
Bernardino iPhone, WASH. POST (Apr. 12, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
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Nonetheless, some critics and Apple itself claimed that the FBI should 
release the information regarding the vulnerability so the security issue can 
be fixed.38  In April of 2016, the FBI maintained that it needed the 
vulnerability in the software for a few more months before it would publicly 
disclose the system’s issues.39 
While the San Bernardino battle may be over, the war over encryption 
between tech companies and law enforcement persists.  In Fall 2017, Apple 
introduced the iPhone 8 and iPhone X equipped with iOS 11, which is 
expected to make seizing data from an iPhone far more difficult.40  Encrypted 
data on Apple devices will, therefore, continue to cause difficulties for law 
enforcement.41 
As encryption technology advances to protect users’ privacy, law 
enforcement continues to struggle with obtaining encrypted information and 
courts continue to grapple with outdated legislation.  Congress must create 
new laws to provide law enforcement with the ability to obtain encrypted 
information to strike the balance between two competing ideas of security: 
(1) the security that strong encryption affords to private individuals, the 
government, and industries such as the financial or healthcare sectors, and 
(2) the security of the United States against threats such as terrorist attacks 
and criminal enterprises. 
III. CRYPTOLOGY AND ITS DEVELOPMENT WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 
A.  Primer on Cryptology 
While encryption and decryption methods have drastically changed 
over time, the idea behind cryptography42 remains substantially the same.43  
In the classic example, Alice wants to send Bob a message that only Bob can 
 
national-security/fbi-paid-professional-hackers-one-time-fee-to-crack-san-bernardino-iphon
e/2016/04/12/5397814a-00de-11e6-9d36-33d198ea26c5_story.html?utm_term=.ebd9df8cc
ee8. 
 38  Id. 
 39  Id. 
 40  Andy Greenberg, Apple’s iOS 11 Will Make it Even Harder for Cops to Extract Your 
Data, WIRED (Sept. 11, 2017), https://www.wired.com/story/apples-ios-11-will-make-it-eve
n-harder-for-cops-to-extract-your-data/.  Even Siri now comes equipped with end-to-end 
encryption.  iOS 11, APPLE.COM, https://www.apple.com/ios/ios-11/. 
 41  See Greenberg, supra note 40. 
 42  Throughout this Comment, the words “cryptography” and “cryptology” are used 
interchangeably.  
 43  This idea of using a “secret language” can be traced back to the Roman Empire.  BERT-
JAAP KOOPS, THE CRYPTO CONTROVERSY: A KEY CONFLICT IN THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 34 
(1999).  By using a substitution method, Julius Caesar allegedly used a Caesar cipher, which 
used a key of three—meaning that to encrypt a message one would use the letter that occurs 
three letters after the actual letter (A would be D).  Id.  
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read.44  Alice, the sender, transforms her message into a different, secret 
language that turns the message into jumble so that any interceptors are 
unable to read the message—this is encryption.45  When Bob receives Alice’s 
message, he uses his cipher or key to translate the jumbled message back into 
an understandable one—this is decryption.46 
While cryptography was originally done by hand, by World War I 
machines were being used to encrypt and decrypt messages using the 
“substitution method” of encryption.47  During World War II, cryptography 
became extremely important for the military.48  For instance, United States 
cryptologists managed to build a replica of the Japanese cryptograph 
machine and used it to break the Japanese’s coded messages throughout the 
war.49  After World War II, the military and United States intelligence 
agencies continued to research cryptography.50  The United States 
established the secret National Security Agency a.k.a. “No Such Agency” 
(NSA),51 which concentrated on developing cryptography.52  The NSA 
primarily focused on two areas of research: (1) creating encryption codes 
that could not be broken to maintain the security of government information 
and (2) gathering and decoding foreign intelligence.53  By the 1970s, 
however, researchers outside the NSA were making headway in the field of 
cryptology and were using computers to encrypt and decrypt data.54  IBM 
introduced a “symmetric system” for encryption that allowed encryption and 
decryption to use the same key.55 
Encryption methods have continued to develop and uses have expanded 
into the private sector, like Apple’s encryption technology.  Apple uses a 
 
 44  See STEVEN LEVY, CRYPTO: HOW THE CODE REBELS BEAT THE GOVERNMENT–SAVING 
PRIVACY IN THE DIGITAL AGE 5–6 (2001). 
 45  Id. 
 46  Id. 
 47  The machines developed would automatically substitute letters for numbers and 
symbols and be able to transpose encrypted messages.  See Koops, supra note 43, at 34.  
 48  Id. 
 49  Id. 
 50  Id. 
 51  The NSA was created in 1952 under President Truman with the purpose of gathering 
intelligence and securing government information.  See LEVY, supra note 44, at 13–14.  The 
agency was known for being very secretive and rarely discussed research publicly, so by the 
early 1970s, some who were in the know would refer to the agency as “No Such Agency.” Id.  
 52  See Koops, supra note 43, at 35.  
 53  The NSA organized itself into two major divisions. See LEVY, supra note 44, at 14.  
Communication Security, or COMSEC, created encryption codes while Communications 
Intelligence, or COMINT, intercepted foreign electronic information and decoded that 
information.  Id.  
 54  See Koops, supra note 43, at 35–36. 
 55  Id. at 35–36, 42–43. 
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“bit” encryption method for its devices.56  For instance, the security measures 
installed on Farook’s iPhone used a 256-bit encryption method.57  This 
method substitutes data on the iPhone and stores the data as a series of “o’s” 
and “1’s”.58  The smartphone then uses a unique number 256 bits long as the 
key to encrypt the data.59  The more bits there are, the more possible keys 
there are to unlock the phone so a 256-bit encryption provides for trillions of 
patterns that could be the key to decrypting the data.60  Apple does not keep 
a copy of the “key” for each iPhone, and without this key, not even Apple 
can unscramble the data.61 
By setting a passcode on the iPhone, the iPhone’s data can only be 
decrypted and accessed by entering the passcode.62  The passcode has 
additional security features that force a wait time after several failed attempts 
at opening the iPhone and provides users with the ability to permanently 
delete information after ten failed passcode attempts.63  These security 
measures prevented the FBI from using a “brute force attack” to unlock 
Farook’s iPhone.64  A brute force attack on encrypted data occurs when a 
program runs every possible combination for the key until it finds the 
combination used to decrypt the data.65  Since the FBI could not use a brute 
force program, the key to an iPhone would likely not be ascertained unless 
some other security measure in the iPhone was exploited.66 
B.  The “Original” Crypto Wars 
Long before Apple’s 256-bit encryption method, United States law 
enforcement had concerns about encryption technology and its ability to 
retrieve encrypted information.67  During the 1990s, two major encryption 
issues developed in the United States.68  Concerned with national security, 
law enforcement pursued regulations regarding: (1) the exportation of 
encryption products and (2) the ability to aid law enforcement in recovering 
 
 56  See Rañoa, supra note 7. 
 57  Id. 
 58  Id. 
 59  Id. 
 60  Id. 
 61  Id. 
 62  See Rañoa, supra note 7. 
 63  Id. 
 64  Id. 
 65  Id. 
 66  See id. 
 67  Jack Karsten & Darrell M. West, A Brief History of U.S. Encryption Policy, 
BROOKINGS (Apr. 19, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2016/04/19/a-brief-hi
story-of-u-s-encryption-policy/. 
 68  Id.  
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encrypted information.69 
With the rise of the Internet, the United States felt as if it had to control 
encryption technology exports to keep them out of the hands of possible 
foreign enemies.70  Through legislation already in place,71 Clinton’s 
Administration classified encryption products under the Commerce Control 
List giving the United States Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Export 
Control the ability to regulate encryption exports.72  Today, the Department 
of Commerce continues to regulate encryption; however, the Bureau of 
Industry and Security (BIS) now oversees export controls.73  As domestic 
regulations regarding encryption products do not exist within the United 
States, the BIS remains mainly responsible for regulating encryption 
products exported on an international level.74  For instance, the encryption 
regulations prohibit exporting encryption products to terrorist-supporting 
countries.75 
While the United States has international export regulations, regulating 
encryption within the United States has presented unique difficulties.  Law 
enforcement agencies wanted to establish legal procedures to receive third-
party assistance in decrypting information.76  In the early 1990s, law 
enforcement approached this issue by introducing the concept of a “key 
escrow.”77  The NSA initially proposed that tech companies voluntarily 
install a “Clipper chip” into the technological network for phones.78  The 
installed chip would encrypt data installed on the phones for its users and 
would make a copy of the user’s key.79  The two parts of the “key” would 
then be held in an “escrow” by two agencies, the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology and the Treasury Department’s Automated 
Systems Division, until law enforcement obtained a valid court order to 
 
 69  Id. 
 70  Id. 
 71  For example see, the International Emergency Economic Power Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 
(2012), the National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1601 (2012), and the Export 
Administration Act, 50 U.S.C. § 2410 (2012).  MARTIN CHARLES GOLUMBIC, FIGHTING 
TERROR ONLINE: THE CONVERGENCE OF SECURITY, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE LAW 80–81, n.67 
(2008). 
 72  GOLUMBIC, supra note 71, at 81. 
 73 Policy Guidance, BUREAU OF INDUS. & SECURITY, https://www.bis.doc.gov/ind
ex.php/policy-guidance/. (last visited Nov. 2, 2017). 
 74  GOLUMBIC, supra note 71, at 81–82.  
 75  See 15 C.F.R. § 740 Supp. 1 (2016).  Currently, there are four countries the United 
States deemed terrorist-supporting countries: Iran, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria.  See 15 
C.F.R. § 740 Supp. 1 (2016). 
 76  See generally, Karsten & West, supra note 67. 
 77  Id.  
 78  See id.; see also KOOPS, supra note 43, at 109. 
 79  See KOOPS, supra note 43, at 109. 
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acquire the information contained on the encrypted phone.80  After obtaining 
the court order to acquire the information, the key’s two parts would be 
released to law enforcement.81 
In 1993, President Clinton introduced the “Clipper chip” concept to the 
public through the voluntary Escrowed Encryption Standard (EES).82  The 
EES faced heavy criticism from privacy advocates who believed a key 
escrow would ultimately become a mandatory control, meaning that the 
voluntary installation would one day become a mandatory installation.83  
Further, technologists believed that a key escrow would create 
vulnerabilities in encryption security that hackers could exploit.84  By 1997, 
the NSA abandoned pursuing the EES system.85 
Congress, however, continued to attempt to address law enforcement’s 
concerns over obtaining encrypted information.  Both the Senate and the 
House drafted competing bills that dealt with regulating encryption 
domestically in the 1990s—many included some type of key escrow or key 
recovery policy.86  Although discussed and drafted, Congress never adopted 
the various proposals due to the key escrow policies that many bills 
contained.87  The hesitation to adopt a full-blown key escrow derived from 
the fact that these systems create major security risks for encryption.88  In 
addition, the inherent complexity and astronomical costs of building a key 
escrow system made employing the escrow system difficult.89 
 
 80  Id. 
 81  Id. 
 82  Id. 
 83  Id.  Documents showed that federal agencies contemplated that there would be a point 
that a voluntary system would not be viable, and a mandatory policy would need to be 
implicated.  Id.  
 84  See generally Peterson, supra note 17 (“[I]f the government has a secret backdoor into 
a technical system, what’s to stop a malicious hacker from finding it?”).  For a discussion of 
the vulnerabilities found within the EES, see Matt Blaze, Protocol Failure in the Escrowed 
Encryption Standard, CRYPTO.COM, http://www.crypto.com/papers/eesproto.pdf. (last visited 
Jan. 13, 2017). 
 85  See KOOPS, supra note 43, at 109. 
 86  See id. at 111–12. The bills included: the Secure Public Networks Act introduced by 
Senators Kerrey, McCain, and Hollings, which promoted the use of a key escrow policy that 
law enforcement would have the ability to access; the Security and Freedom through 
Encryption Act (SAFE) introduced in the House by Representative Goodlatte, and later 
amended by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence to include a key escrow 
policy (a competing version of this bill, amended by the House Commerce Committee, 
mandated that the government may not impose a key escrow policy; however, these two 
conflicting versions of the bill made it “unfit for voting.”); and the E-Privacy Act that would 
create a National Electronic Technologies (NET) Center to assist law enforcement.  Id.  
 87  See id. 
 88  Peter Swire, Encryption and Globalization, 13 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 416, 436 
(2012). 
 89  Id. at 437. 
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The United States examined alternative encryption control methods to 
a key escrow such as installing encryption products with technical 
“backdoors” or, rather, pre-installed software that allows the manufacturer 
to access encrypted information without the user’s permission.90  Yet, 
backdoors also faced criticism because the encryption producers have no 
way to ensure that only “good guys”—law enforcement enforcing a search 
warrant—maintain an exclusive entrance.91  “Bad guys,” including hackers 
intending to steal information, could exploit the intentional vulnerability.92  
After the mounting disapproval over domestic encryption regulations to aid 
law enforcement, the United States government abandoned the endeavor.93  
Consequently, an open question remains regarding encryption producers’ 
role in aiding law enforcement within the United States. 
C.   “Going Dark”: Challenges Faced by Today’s Law Enforcement 
While law enforcement had no legal means tailored to compel 
assistance from encryption producers, other agencies within the United 
States’ government continued programs aimed at weakening strong 
encryption products such as the NSA.94  When Edward Snowden, a former 
NSA contractor, defected in 2013, he revealed to the world documents that 
showed the NSA conducted a secret program called “Bullrun” to decrypt 
data within the United States.95  Until Snowden revealed this information, 
the NSA kept its capabilities to decrypt digital information a closely guarded 
secret.96 
Once the secret leaked that the NSA had decryption spying capabilities 
in 2013, tech companies like Apple started pushing the bounds of encryption 
by pre-installing its products with “end-to-end encryption.”97  End-to-end 
encryption gives only the sender and recipient the key to unlock the data 
 
 90  Parker Higgins, On the Clipper Chip’s Birthday, Looking Back on Decades of Key 
Escrow Failures, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 16, 2015, 1:07 PM), https://www.eff
.org/deeplinks/2015/04/clipper-chips-birthday-looking-back-22-years-key-escrow-failures; 
see also Pell, supra note 20. 
 91  Swire, supra note 88, at 433. 
 92  Id. 
 93  See Higgins, supra note 90. 
 94  Nicole Perlroth et al., N.S.A. Able to Foil Basic Safeguards of Privacy on Web, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 5, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/06/us/nsa-foils-much-internet-encry
ption.html?pagewanted=2&_r=3. 
 95  Id.  A key feature of the Bullrun program was that Internet companies voluntarily 
cooperated with the NSA.  Id.  For instance, the NSA uses the Sigint Enabling Project to 
incentivize tech companies to “covertly influence and/or overtly leverage” designs to make 
them “exploitable” and had spent more than $250 million a year on the program.  Id.  The 
NSA had capabilities including having an American manufacturer actually install a backdoor 
onto a computer being shipped to a foreign intelligence target.  Id. 
 96  Id.  
 97  See Peterson, supra note 17. 
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making it highly secure.98  In its approach to privacy statement, Apple 
emphasized that end-to-end encryption does not allow the company to 
decrypt a user’s message when in transit between devices.99  Apple has also 
stated that regarding “all devices running iOS 8.0 and later versions, Apple 
is unable to perform an iOS device data extraction as the data typically 
sought by law enforcement is encrypted, and Apple does not possess the 
encryption key.”100  Since end-to-end encryption has been introduced, law 
enforcement has become increasingly nervous that this encryption 
technology will shelter criminals and terrorists, thus putting the United 
States’s public safety and national security at risk.101 
Stronger end-to-end encryption products mean challenges for law 
enforcement; however, advances in this type of encryption technology also 
have many benefits.102  Strong encryption benefits every private individual—
not just criminals or terrorists—as encryption is used to protect financial 
information, healthcare information, government information, military data, 
and data from intelligence agencies.103  For instance, with more than fifty-
one percent of United States adults using online banking today,104 powerful 
encryption helps protect this sensitive information from being hacked or 
stolen.105  Without powerful encryption, many online banking or financial 
transfers might be vulnerable to fraudulent transactions or cyber-attacks.106 
While the public reaps benefits from encryption, strong encryption 
hinders law enforcement investigations, and even prosecuting criminal 
behavior.  When bad actors, such as terrorists, use encryption to hide 
activities and conceal evidence of criminal activity, a “digital crime scene” 
 
 98  Id. 
 99  Our Approach to Privacy, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/privacy/approach-to-
privacy/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2017). 
 100  LEGAL PROCESS GUIDELINES, APPLE 10 (June 23, 2017), https://www.apple.com/
legal/privacy/law-enforcement-guidelines-us.pdf.   
 101  See HOUSE HOMELAND SEC. COMM. MAJORITY STAFF REP., GOING DARK, GOING 
FORWARD: A PRIMER ON THE ENCRYPTION DEBATE 10 (2016), https://homeland.house.gov
/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Staff-Report-Going-Dark-Going-Forward.pdf [hereinafter 
HOMELAND SEC. REP.]. 
 102  A dual use product, such as encryption, can be used for both military and peaceful, 
civil purposes. See KOOPS, supra note 43, at 98. 
 103  See HOMELAND SEC. REP., supra note 101 at 7. 
 104  Id. at 8. 
 105  Id. at 8–9. 
 106  Id.  For example, seven Iranian hackers were indicted in March 2016 for systematically 
attacking targets including Bank of America, the New York Stock Exchange, Capital One and 
ING, and PNC Bank, which “stopped hundreds of thousands of customers from accessing 
their accounts and cost the businesses millions of dollars as they raced to protect their servers.”  
Tom Winters & Tracy Connor, Iranians Charged with Cyber Attacks on U.S. Banks, Dam, 
NBC NEWS (Mar. 24, 2016, 10:56 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/iranians-
charged-hacking-attacks-u-s-banks-dam-n544801.  
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is created, but is unreachable by law enforcement investigators and 
prosecutors.107  For example, the Office of the District Attorney for New 
York County cited 175 cases between September 2014 and March 2016 in 
which the office struggled to obtain evidence because the investigators could 
not access digital information from encrypted devices.108  Law enforcement 
agencies like the FBI cannot access the “digital crime scene” so they face 
“going dark.”109 
Former FBI Director James Comey described “going dark” as the 
“phenomenon in which law enforcement personnel have the ‘legal authority 
to intercept and access communication and information pursuant to court 
order,’ but ‘lack the technical ability to do so.’”110  Director Comey also 
understands the competing interests at stake: 
We must ensure both the fundamental right of people to engage in 
private communications as well as the protection of the public. 
One of the bedrock principles upon which we rely to guide us is 
the principle of judicial authorization: that if an independent judge 
finds reason to believe that certain private communications 
contain evidence of a crime, then the government can conduct a 
limited search for that evidence. For example, by having a neutral 
arbiter—the judge—evaluate whether the government’s evidence 
satisfies the appropriate standard, we have been able to protect the 
public and safeguard citizens’ constitutional rights. . . . We would 
like to emphasize that the Going Dark problem is, at base, one of 
technological choices and capability.111 
Comey insists that law enforcement is not looking to expand 
surveillance capabilities.112  Law enforcement merely wants the opportunity 
to obtain encrypted information for investigations pursuant to a legal 
authority.113 
Others in law enforcement have acknowledged similar “going dark” 
problems with obtaining encrypted information.  Former New York Police 
Department (“NYPD”) Police Commissioner Bill Bratton found that Apple’s 
refusal to unlock Farook’s iPhone was a display of “corporate 
irresponsibility.”114  During a press conference with Bratton, Manhattan’s 
 
 107  See HOMELAND SEC. REP., supra note 101, at 10. 
 108  Id. 
 109  See infra note 110 and accompanying text. 
 110  HOMELAND SEC. REP., supra note 101, at 5 (quoting former FBI Director James 
Comey). 
 111  The Encryption Tightrope: Balancing Americans’ Security and Privacy Before H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 11–12 (2016) (statement of James B. Comey, Director, 
Federal Bureau of Investigations). 
 112  Id. at 12. 
 113  Id. 
 114  Graham Rayman & Leonard Greene, NYPD Commissioner Bill Bratton, Manhattan 
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District Attorney, Cyrus Vance, displayed numerous inaccessible, encrypted 
iPhones on a table to reporters and expressed frustration over the dilemma 
by stating, “[i]t’s very difficult to explain to a victim of crime that we can’’t 
get evidence because of cellphone technology.”115  NYPD Deputy 
Commissioner, John Miller, agreed, stating, “now totally encrypted devices 
like the Apple iPhone, cannot be penetrated even with a search warrant from 
a judge.”116  Similarly, Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Captain Chris Cahhal 
asserted that an encrypted iPhone makes a “nice paperweight,” because the 
department has no way to access the information encrypted on those 
devices.117  Hillar C. Moore, III, the District Attorney for East Baton Rouge, 
acknowledges that not all encrypted phone data may lead to an arrest or 
prosecution; however, he believes that law enforcement should have the 
capability to look for clues.118  These statements demonstrate that both 
federal law enforcement, like the FBI, and local law enforcement are facing 
a massive “going dark” problem. 
Despite this “going dark” problem, Apple continues to resist assisting 
law enforcement.  Apple requires the government to present a warrant or 
subpoena for information requests.119  Apple also specifically stated that it 
cannot perform data extractions on iOS 8 and newer software as it does not 
have the encryption key.120 
A study conducted by the Berkman Center for Internet & Society at 
Harvard University supports the theory that law enforcement can obtain 
 
DA Cyrus Vance Blast Apple’s Unwillingness to Unlock Criminals’ iPhones, NY DAILY NEWS 
(Feb. 18, 2016, 3:43 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/bill-bratton-blasts-apple-
encryption-stance-article-1.2536506.  
 115  Id.  For example, the Manhattan District Attorney’s office has been stalled in 
collecting any evidence from the main suspect’s encrypted iPhone for the murder of a Hofstra 
graduate student due to the phone’s password protection despite the existence of a search 
warrant.  Shayna Jacobs, iPhone of Suspect in Hofstra Grad Student Murder Inaccessible to 
Prosecutors, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/iphone-suspect-
hofstra-grad-student-murder-locked-da-article-1.3492123 (last updated Sept. 14, 2017, 4:49 
AM).   
 116  Eric Geller, Top NYPD Official Says Apple’s Encryption Helps Murderers and 
Kidnappers, DAILY DOT (Mar. 7, 2016, 9:35 AM), http://www.dailydot.com/layer8/apple-
iphone-encryption-nypd-john-miller-kidnappers-murderers/. 
 117  Kate Mather & James Queally, The Federal Government Is Fighting Apple for 
Something the Police Want Too, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2016, 11:15 AM), http://www.latimes
.com/business/technology/la-me-apple-police-20160226-story.html.  
 118  Mather, supra note 117.  Moore hit a dead end in an open murder investigation due to 
an encrypted iPhone.  Id.  In April 2015, an unknown assailant murdered an eight-months 
pregnant woman named Brittney Mills in her Baton Rouge home.  Id.  Investigators obtained 
a warrant for Mills’ iPhone, but Mills’ iPhone ran iOS 8 or later version of software.  Id.  
Apple, therefore, refused to crack the device.  Id. 
 119  Government Information Requests, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/privacy/governmen
t-information-requests/ (last visited Jan. 13, 2017). 
 120  See Legal Process Guidelines, supra note 100.  
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information in ways other than compelling assistance from non-government 
tech companies like Apple.121  Law enforcement may use methods involving 
metadata to mine for information122 or malware to catch data before 
encryption.123  Despite these alternative methods for law enforcement 
surveillance,124 law enforcement still faces enormous challenges in obtaining 
information from the “digital crime scene”125 without a proper legal 
foundation. 
IV.   THE CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR COMPELLING THIRD PARTIES 
TO BYPASS ENCRYPTION 
Without any guidance from Congress, courts have struggled to apply 
an appropriate legal framework to compel third party encryption producers 
to assist law enforcement in obtaining information related to open 
investigations.  Courts, like the District Court for the Central District of 
California, have used existing wiretapping legislation and extraordinary writ 
measures to compel aid from non-governmental third parties like Apple;126 
however, neither existing wiretapping legislation nor extraordinary writ 
measures are appropriate in compelling a completely private encryption 
producer to decrypt a user’s encrypted information for law enforcement.127 
 
 
 121  See MATT OLSEN ET AL., DON’T PANIC. MAKING PROGRESS ON THE “GOING DARK” 
DEBATE 2–3 (2016), https://cyber.harvard.edu/pubrelease/dont-panic/Dont_Panic_Making_
Progress_on_Going_Dark_Debate.pdf [hereinafter BERKMAN STUDY] (noting that the “going 
dark” metaphor does not accurately describe current law enforcement conditions).  See also 
Pell, supra note 20, at 625–27. 
 122  See id. at 3, 9.  Metadata is not encrypted, and not likely to become encrypted.  Id.  
Metadata can reveal information such as email addresses and mobile device location.  Id.  
Since metadata is plaintext, this is a source surveillance information for law enforcement.  Id.  
 123  See Pell, supra note 20, 635 n.130, 641–42. (citing Matt Apuzzo, F.B.I. Used Hacking 
Software Decade Before iPhone Fight, N.Y. TIMES (April 13, 2016), http://mobile.nytimes.
com/2016/04/14/technology/fbi-tried-to-defeat-encryption-10-years-ago-files-show.html?_r
=2 (discussing how the FBI remotely installed malware on a computer as a part of criminal 
wiretap in order to circumvent encryption)).  In order to gain access to encrypted information, 
law enforcement may hack a smartphone and install malware designed to catch voice 
communications and keystrokes before encryption.  Id. 
 124  Since law enforcement has new alternatives for surveying criminal activity, Peter 
Swire believes that today is the “golden age for surveillance.”  Swire, supra note 88, at 460–
73.  The phrase “golden age for surveillance” refers to the idea that law enforcement’s 
surveillance activities are greatly enhanced compared to earlier periods of time.  Id.  For a 
discussion on the idea that technology has advanced to provide law enforcement with more 
means to survey the population, see Swire, supra note 88, at 460–73. 
 125  See supra text accompanying note 107.  
 126  See In re An Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant on a 
Black Lexus IS300, No. ED 15-0451M, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20543 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 
2016). 
 127  See infra Part IV.A–B. 
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A.  The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act 
Cannot Reasonably Be Applied to Today’s Encryption Products 
Law enforcement has considered Communications Assistance for Law 
Enforcement Act (CALEA) as one avenue of fitting today’s encryption 
producers within a legislative framework.128  Congress enacted CALEA so 
that law enforcement authorities with a proper court order could 
“intercept . . . communications.”129  Under CALEA, telecommunication 
carriers, telephone companies, and telecommunication manufacturers must 
have built-in surveillance systems that law enforcement can access and 
monitor. 130 
The capability requirements under CALEA are subject to exceptions.  
For instance, “information services” are exempt from CALEA’s assistance 
requirements.131  This Act defines “information services” as “the offering of 
a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, 
retrieving, utilizing, or making available information via 
telecommunications.”132  Further, CALEA carves out special measures for 
encryption stating that “telecommunication carriers”133 are not required to 
decrypt any information or communication unless the carrier provided the 
encryption and has the information available to decrypt the data.134  CALEA 
remains silent on whether “information service[s]” have any role in aiding 
law enforcement with encryption. 
American Council on Education v. FCC solidifies the interpretation that 
CALEA’s statutory language exempts information services from assisting 
law enforcement.135  In American Council, the D.C. Circuit emphasized that 
CALEA’s language clearly limits law enforcement from compelling 
information services to comply with controls such as installing monitoring 
devices.136  The D.C. Circuit ultimately concluded that broadband providers 
fell within CALEA’s scope because broadband providers fit the definition of 
 
 128  See 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001–10 (2012). 
 129  See id. § 1002(a)(1).  
 130  Swire, supra note 88, at 421–22. 
 131  47 U.S.C. § 1002(b)(2)(A) (2012). 
 132  Id. § 1001(6). 
 133  Id. § 1001(8)(A) (emphasis added).  “The term ‘telecommunications carrier’ (A) 
means a person or entity engaged in the transmission or switching of wire or electronic 
communications as a common carrier for hire.”  Id.  
 134  Id. § 1002(b)(3). 
 135  See Am. Council on Educ. v. FCC, 451 F.3d 226, 228 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 136  Id.  (citing 47 U.S.C. § 1001(8)(C)(i)). 
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“telecommunication carrier” rather than “information service.”137  Although 
the D.C. Circuit broadened CALEA’s scope to include broadband providers, 
companies like Apple remain outside CALEA’s purview.138 
Apple deals in convergence technology,139 and cannot be considered 
either a broadband provider or a telecommunication carrier.  Judge 
Orenstein, the presiding judge for In re Order Requiring Apple, Inc. to Assist, 
reasoned that CALEA applies only to “telecommunication carriers,” and 
specifically exempts certain areas within the technology industry.140  Judge 
Orenstein concluded that Apple falls within the technology industry 
exemption and would not be considered a telecommunication carrier because 
Apple produces convergence technology.141 
Therefore, law enforcement cannot rely on CALEA to compel Apple to 
unlock iPhones and override security devices.  Nor could CALEA compel 
any other encryption producer that does not fit the statutory definition of 
“telecommunication carrier” to assist in obtaining encrypted information.  In 
addition, CALEA has not been updated in over twenty years to reflect 
modern technology.142  Without some type of amendment to CALEA, 
devices with encryption protections, like the iPhone, will remain out of law 
enforcement’s reach.143 
B.  The AWA Is an Extraordinary Measure to Use Against Private 
Third-Party Companies 
Law enforcement has also utilized the “AWA” to compel third party 
encryption producers to assist with decrypting information.  While 
 
 137  See id. at 232–36 (emphasizing that the standard of review was extremely deferential 
to the FCC’s “reasonable” interpretation of the phrase “telecommunications carrier” in the 
CALEA). 
 138  “CALEA is not viewed as applying to data contained on smart phones. . . .”  See Peter 
T. King, Remembering the Lessons of 9/11: Preserving Tools and Authorities in the Fight 
Against Terrorism, 41 J. LEGIS. 173, 178 (2015). 
 139  See Christy Roland, The Complete and Modern Guide to Technology Convergence, 
AT&T DEVELOPER PROGRAM (May 15, 2017, 11:48 AM), https://developer.att.com/blog/tech
nology-convergence (“[A]n example of technology convergence is smartphones, which 
combine the functionality of a telephone, a camera, a music player, and a digital personal 
assistant.”).  Convergence technology is when a single device contains two or more different 
technological capabilities, i.e., a cell phone that can also be used as a camera.  See Bill Ward, 
The Impact of Technology Convergence, DIGITILIST MAG. (Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.digita
listmag.com/innovation/2014/08/06/impact-of-technology-convergence-01257734. “” 
 140  N.Y. Apple iPhone Case, 149 F. Supp. 3d at 354–55. 
 141  Id. at 356–57. 
 142  See Matthew Braga, The FBI Is at War with Apple Because it Couldn’t Change 
Wiretap Law, VICE: MOTHERBOARD (Mar. 1, 2016), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/ar
ticle/z434z4/calea-my-old-friend..  Congress passed CALEA in 1994.  Id. ’ 
 143  Around 2009, the FBI and the Department of Justice discussed amending CALEA to 
encompass technology like smartphones and e-mail.  See King, supra note 138, at 178–79.  
These proposed amendments, however, were never sent to Congress.  Id. 
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considered an extraordinary writ, the AWA has been invoked at least sixty 
times since 2008 to compel Apple and Google to provide assistance in 
obtaining information from devices.144  While law enforcement has 
successfully compelled private third party assistance under the AWA,145 law 
enforcement cannot use the AWA to properly compel Apple to undermine 
its own security features. 
Passed in 1789, the AWA permits federal courts to issue “all writs 
necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable 
to the usages and principles of law.”146  The AWA can be used to compel 
private third parties to provide technical assistance in certain situations.147  
In United States v. New York Telephone Company, the New York Telephone 
Company resisted an order to provide technical assistance to the FBI to 
install pen registers148 by refusing to lease the telephones lines the FBI 
needed to install pen registers.149  The Supreme Court found that the AWA 
may be applied to third parties as an auxiliary measure when that third party 
is “in a position to frustrate the implementation of a court order or the proper 
administration of justice.”150  According to the FBI, the New York Telephone 
Company’s own property, the physical telephone lines, were likely being 
used to further criminal activity.151  The Court ruled that the FBI properly 
invoked the AWA because the New York Telephone Company was closely 
related to the matter being investigated by the FBI.152  Further, the Court 
concluded that the technical assistance the order required—to install pen 
registers—was in no way burdensome to the New York Telephone Company 
because the company simply had to provide the FBI with access to the 
lines.153  Finally, the Court found that the New York Telephone’s Company 
assistance was necessary because the court order to tap the lines could not 
 
 144  Eliza Sweren-Becker, This Map Shows How the Apple-FBI Fight Was About Much 
More Than One Phone, ACLU BLOG (Mar. 30, 2016, 9:00 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/
privacy-technology/internet-privacy/map-shows-how-apple-fbi-fight-was-about-much-more
-one-phone?redirect=blog/speak-freely/map-shows-how-apple-fbi-fight-was-about-much-m
ore-one-phone.  
 145  Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai, Feds Say Apple Has Unlocked Suspects’’ iPhones “At 
Least” 70 Times in the Past, VICE: MOTHERBOARD (Oct. 26, 2015), https://motherboard.vice
.com/en_us/article/4xagvq/feds-say-apple-has-unlocked-suspects-iphones-at-least-70-times-
in-the-past.  
 146  All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2012). 
 147  The Act itself does not identify examples; however, case law has identified situations 
when courts may issue this extraordinary writ.  See, e.g., United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 
U.S. 159 (1977).  
 148  Pen registers are a type of wiretapping device.  Id. at n.1. 
 149  N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 161–63. 
 150  Id. at 174–75. 
 151  Id. at 174–78. 
 152  Id. 
 153  Id. at 174–75. 
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be carried out without access to the physical lines.154 
Under New York Telephone Company’s reasoning, law enforcement 
has attempted to leverage the AWA in a similar manner against companies 
like Apple.  In In re Order Requiring Apple, Inc. to Assist, law enforcement 
tried to use the AWA as an auxiliary measure to CALEA to compel Apple’s 
technical assistance in circumventing security measures in an encrypted 
iPhone.155  This argument, however, initially failed on its face because Apple 
is a technology company that falls outside the scope of CALEA.156  
Therefore, ordering Apple’s assistance to decrypt an iPhone could not be a 
proper auxiliary measure to CALEA.157  In addition, Judge Orenstein 
concluded that the AWA could not be used as a “gap filler”158 for holes in 
CALEA because CALEA’s legislative scheme is so comprehensive that it 
implicitly prevents imposing orders onto private third parties like Apple.159  
The executive branch cannot use the AWA “to achieve a legislative goal that 
Congress has considered and rejected.”160 
Judge Orenstein also distinguished the facts of In re Order Requiring 
Apple, Inc. to Assist from those presented in New York Telephone 
Company.161  First, unlike a telephone carrier that owns telephone lines, 
Apple’s property was not used in the commission of a crime; rather, the 
 
 154  Id. 
 155  See N.Y. Apple iPhone Case, 149 F. Supp. 3d at 352–57. 
 156  See supra note 138, and accompanying text. 
 157  See N.Y. Apple iPhone Case, 149 F. Supp. 3d at 354, 360–64.  Arguably, CALEA 
absolves a company like Apple from having any responsibility to assist law enforcement.  See 
id. 
 158  Id. at 353, 357–58.  “Gap filler” refers to the fact that Congress cannot anticipate every 
circumstance a court may act to “properly . . . vindicate the rights of parties before it.”  Id.  
Therefore, the AWA acts as a piece of legislation for courts to perform their duty even when 
there is gap within legislation as long as that gap is “agreeable to the usages and principles of 
law.”  Id.  The AWA’s statutory language of “usages” and “principles” compels the 
conclusion that the order must not merely be consistent with the law, but be “consonant with 
both the manner in which the laws were developed . . . and the manner in which the laws have 
been interpreted and implemented.”  Id.  
 159  Id. at 354. 
 160 N.Y. Apple iPhone Case, 149 F. Supp. 3d at 360; CALEA’s history reveals that 
Congress considered whether the CALEA should be expanded to cover technology such as 
the iPhone, but have yet to reach a consensus.  See id. n.25; see also In re Order Requiring 
Apple, Inc. to Assist in the Execution of a Search Warrant Issued by this Court, No. 15-mc-
01902, 2015 WL 5920207, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2015). 
  Further, the FBI has not sought to use the legislature as a means to deal with the issue 
of encryption.  See James B. Comey, Dir., FBI, Statement Before the Senate Committee on 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, (Oct. 8, 2015), https://www.fbi
.gov/news/testimony/threats-to-the-homeland (“The United States government is actively 
engaged with private companies to ensure they understand the public safety and national 
security risks that result from malicious actors’ use of their encrypted products and services.  
However, the administration is not seeking legislation at this time.”). 
 161  N.Y. Apple iPhone Case, 149 F. Supp. 3d at 364. 
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criminal used his own property, which distanced Apple’s role from the 
matter.162  Further, while the telecommunication industry, such as phone 
companies, is a heavily regulated utility “with a duty to serve the public,”163 
Apple remains a private business and, like any other private entity, has no 
duty to serve the public.164 
Unlike the New York Telephone Company, Apple would also bear a 
much larger burden by having an order of compelled technical assistance 
enforced against it.  Apple is a private company that owes a duty to its 
shareholders—not the United States government or law enforcement.165  The 
technical assistance the FBI requested would require Apple to undermine its 
own security measures, which would tarnish the Apple brand.166  Further, 
Apple is not in the line of work to bypass its own security measures and this 
act would be offensive to the business.167  Apple would also have to dedicate 
many hours to unlocking the device.168  Thus, if the government continued 
with requests to compel Apple to unlock iPhones on a massive scale, Apple’s 
productivity would be significantly impacted.169 
Finally, “necessity” also failed to support the argument that an 
extraordinary writ should be issued to compel Apple to bypass its own 
software.170  The FBI contradicted itself throughout the case by arguing that 
it could only decrypt the iPhone with Apple’s help, while later claiming that 
there were circumstances when law enforcement had the capabilities to 
decrypt a specific phone without the help of private third parties.171  
Therefore, Judge Orenstein concluded that the government did not present 
the pressing necessity needed to issue an extraordinary writ.172 
Not all courts have followed In re Order Requiring Apple, Inc. to 
Assist’s reasoning;173 however, Judge Orenstein’s opinion provides 
 
 162  Id. at 364–65. 
 163  United States v. N.Y., Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 174 (1977). 
 164  N.Y. Apple iPhone Case, 149 F. Supp. 3d at 364–65. 
 165  Id. at 369. 
 166  Id. 
 167  Id.  Apple prides itself as being a producer of secure products and Apple is “committed 
to keeping [] personal information safe.”  See Our Approach to Privacy, APPLE, http://www.
apple.com/privacy/approach-to-privacy/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2017). 
 168  N.Y. Apple iPhone Case, 149 F. Supp. 3d at 370–71. 
 169  Id.  
 170  Id. at 375. 
 171  Id. 
 172  Id. 
 173  See In re Order Requiring [XXX], Inc., No. 14 Mag. 2258, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
154743, at *1–6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2014).  Compared to Judge Orenstein’s reasoning, In re 
Order Requiring XXX, Inc. reasons that the AWA does apply in compelling third-party tech 
companies to decrypt devices for law enforcement.  See id.   This decision, made prior to 
Judge Orenstein’s ruling, simply concluded a tech company must assist in unlocking a 
cellphone as it was required in N.Y. Tel. Co.  See id. 
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ammunition for Apple in future litigation.  As made obvious by In re Order 
Requiring Apple, Inc. to Assist, compelling a private tech company to decrypt 
a device is not analogous to compelling a phone company to provide access 
to phone lines so the FBI can install wiretapping devices.174  Therefore, law 
enforcement will likely have much more difficulty in utilizing the AWA to 
compel assistance from encryption producers in the future. 
V.   CONGRESS MUST ADDRESS A TECHNOLOGICAL COMPANY’S ROLE IN 
WORKING WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT 
A.  Prior to Legislating, Congress Must First Better Understand 
Encryption Today 
Congress must be proactive by introducing new legislation or updating 
current legislation to ensure that law enforcement has the capability to 
receive assistance from encryption producers.175  On February 29, 2016, two 
Senators introduced the Digital Security Commission Act of 2016.176  
Proposed by House Homeland Security Chairman Michael McCaul and 
Senator Mark Warner, the bill called to form a bipartisan177 National 
 
 174  See supra Part IV.A–B. 
 175  Michael McCaul & Mark Warner, Opinion, How to Unite Privacy and Security—
Before the Next Terrorist Attack, WASH. POST (Dec. 27, 2015), https://www.washing
tonpost.com/opinions/how-to-unite-privacy-and-security—before-the-next-terrorist-attack/2
015/12/27/628537c4-a9b3-11e5-9b92-dea7cd4b1a4d_story.html?utm_term=.1be00f88e00c.  
 176  HOMELAND SEC. REP., supra note 101, at 17.  Although the bill passed the House in 
2016, the Senate did not vote on the bill so it is possible that this legislation will be re-visited 
under the Trump administration.  Mintz Levin Cohn Ferris Glovsky & Popeo PC, Federal 
Cybersecurity Landscape for 2017, LEXOLOGY (Jan. 3, 2017), https://www.lexology.co
m/library/detail.aspx?g=045e64ca-81b2-4a05-ad9a-c493fe88d105.  Another bill regarding 
encryption was also introduced by Senators Burr and Feinstein around the same time; 
however, this bill was highly criticized as it was considered essentially mandating tech 
companies to compromise their own products for law enforcement and did not gain any 
traction.  See, e.g., Rainy Reitman, Security Win: Burr-Feinstein Proposal Declared “Dead” 
for This Year, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (May 27, 2016), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/
2016/05/win-one-security-burr-feinstein-proposal-declared-dead-year.  
 177  The legislation is co-sponsored in the Senate by Senators Cory Gardner (R-CO), Brian 
Schatz (D-HI), Susan Collins (R-ME), Michael Bennet (D-CO), Shelley Moore Capito (R-
WV), Angus King (I-ME), Dean Heller (R-NV), Bill Nelson (D-FL), Steve Daines (R-MT), 
Michael Bennet (D-CO), Jeff Flake (R-AZ), Martin Heinrich (D-NM), Rob Portman (R-OH), 
Mike Rounds (R-SD), Thomas Carper (D-DE) and Gary Peters (D-MI).  Sen. Warner Leads 
Bipartisan Coalition to Create a National Commission on Digital Security, MARK R. 
WARNER, http://www.warner.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=sen-warner-leads-bipartisan-
coalition-to-create-a-national-commission-on-digital-security_7 (last visited Jan. 13, 2017).  
In addition to Chairman McCaul, House co-sponsors are Representatives Jim Langevin (R-
RI), Patrick Meehan (R-PA), Mike Bishop (R-MI), Ted Lieu (D-CA), Will Hurd (R-TX), 
Kathleen Rice (D-NY), Blake Farenthold (R-TX), Eric Swalwell (D-CA), Dan Donovan (R-
NY), Jerry McNerney (D-CA), Barbara Comstock (R-VA), Mimi Walters (R-CA), Ryan 
Costello (R-PA),  Dave Reichert (R-WA), Earl ““Buddy”“ Carter (R-GA), Peter King (R-
NY), Candice Miller (R-MI), John Katko (R-NY), Lamar Smith (R-TX), Barry Loudermilk 
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Commission on Security and Technology Challenges (“the Commission”) 
comprised of cryptologists, law enforcement, intelligence agencies, and 
others in the tech sector to propose solutions to the encryption challenges 
presently faced by law enforcement.178 
Senator Warner stated that the Commission would “strike an 
appropriate balance that protects Americans’ privacy, American security, 
and American competitiveness.”179  The Commission would achieve this 
balance by: (1) assembling the brightest minds in the industry; (2) creating 
an open national dialogue on the topic; and (3) moving quickly.180  The 
Commission would also issue an interim report within six months after it 
convened and then make recommendations to Congress within twelve 
months.181 
Although the Commission presents a possible compromise between the 
tech industry and law enforcement, some civil liberty advocates vehemently 
oppose the idea of the United States government meeting with technological 
companies.182  The Electronic Frontier Foundation (“EFF”)183 believes that 
a commission like that proposed by the Digital Security Commission Act 
would simply continue an unnecessary conversation that was already hashed 
out during the crypto wars of the 1990s.184  During the 1990s, Congress took 
 
(R-GA), Martha McSally (R-AZ), Mike Rogers (R-AL), Jeff Duncan (R-SC), Susan Brooks 
(R-IN), Mark Walker (R-NC), John Ratcliffe (R-TX), Betty and McCollum (D-MN).  Id. 
 178  HOMELAND SEC. REP., supra note 101, at 17. 
 179  See Sen. Warner Leads Bipartisan Coalition to Create a National Commission on 
Digital Security, supra note 177.  FBI Director Christopher Wray has also discussed achieving 
a “balance” between law enforcement and technology companies though Wray was not yet 
able to articulate a solution for the issue.  Christopher Wray, Dir., FBI, Statement Before the 
House Judiciary Committee, ( July 12, 2017), https://www.hatch.senate.gov/public/index.cf
m/releases?ID=C41F131A-D1E7-4E50-8E2B-1548A7EDCF17. 
 180  McCaul-Warner Commission on Digital Security, HOMELAND SECURITY COMM., 
https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/McCaul-Warner-Commission-On
e-pager-1.pdf (last visited Jan. 13, 2017). 
 181  Id.   
 182  See, e.g., Erin Kelly, Electronic Privacy Advocates Split Over Encryption Commission 
in New Bill, USA TODAY (Mar. 11, 2016), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/201
6/03/11/electronic-privacy-advocates-split-over-encryption-commission-new-bill/81600870
/.  Similarly, FBI Director Wray’s comments on achieving a balance have also be criticized.  
See Kevin Collier, The Encryption ‘Balance’ Trump’s FBI Candidate Wants Is 
Mathematically Impossible, NY MAG. (July 12, 2017), http://nymag.com/selectall/2017/
07/the-encryption-balance-fbi-nominee-wants-is-impossible.html.  
 183  About EFF, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/about (last visited Jan. 13, 
2017).  The Electron Frontier Foundation (“EFF”) is a nonprofit organization that defends 
civil liberties within the digital world including privacy, free expression, and innovation.  Id.  
Technologist, activists, and attorneys at EFF “defend free speech online, fight illegal 
surveillance, advocate for users and innovators, and support freedom-enhancing 
technologies.”  Id. 
 184  Mark Jaycox, EFF Opposes McCaul-Warner Encryption Commission, ELEC. 
FRONTIER FOUND. (Mar. 7, 2016), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/03/eff-opposes-
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similar attempts to reconcile law enforcement’s ability to obtain information 
with protecting the private tech industry, which led to no solutions.185  EFF 
imagines that the Commission’s solution will merely be to create a key 
escrow, which has already been a heavily rejected solution.186  Despite 
opposition from the EFF, Apple has shown support for having a commission 
between the tech industry and the federal government in an effort to foster a 
national dialogue about encryption.187 
The EFF also fails to consider the alternatives if a new encryption 
discussion fails to occur between the tech industry and the federal 
government in the United States.  The American public will face an ongoing 
controversy surrounding encryption without a dialogue, especially if another 
domestic terrorist attack occurs.188  The Commission, or a similar 
commission, will help establish that encryption technology is not the 
problem, but the system that does not afford law enforcement a remedy is 
the problem.  The Commission will focus on fixing a broken system that has 
public safety at odds with personal privacy.189  Further, Congress has limited 
expertise in this new area of technology so a panel of experts within the 
matter can better facilitate a more informed discussion to create a system of 
regulatory oversight.190  As the Wall Street Journal Editorial Board stated, 
A mature democracy—if America still is one—ought to be able to 
work out these crucial matters of national security through 
legislative deliberation.  The public interest on encryption is best 
served with a rational debate, not the ad hoc nuclear legal 
exchange that the Administration is inviting.191 
After meeting with experts in the field and better understanding the 
technology, Congress would have a better path forward to knowledgably 
adopt legislation and regulations.  The Commission may even consider new 
methods for law enforcement to access information on encrypted devices.  
One approach could be a legal hacking regime.192  Another strategy that the 
Commission may look to for regulating encryption domestically could be a 
 
mccaul-warner-encryption-commission. 
 185  Id; see also supra Part III.B and accompanying text. 
 186  See Jaycox supra note 184; see also supra Part III.B and accompanying text. 
 187  Brian Bennett, Apple Backs Idea for Panel to Study Technology and National Security, 
L.A. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-apple-commission-2-20
160223-story.html.  
 188  See McCaul & Warner, supra note 175. 
 189  See Ryan Hagemann, The Path Forward on Encryption: The McCaul-Warner 
Commission, LAWFARE BLOG (June 24, 2016, 2:10 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/path-
forward-encryption-mccaul-warner-commission.  
 190  Id. 
 191  Joe Rago, Editorial, The FBI vs. Apple, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 19, 2016), http://www.
wsj.com/articles/the-fbi-vs-apple-1455840721.  
 192  Id. 
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licensing scheme like the one implemented in Israel.193 
B. Israel Strikes a Regulatory Balance Between National Security 
and Individual Liberty for Encryption 
The Israeli government needs highly secure encryption codes to protect 
information within their own national agencies, but the Israeli government 
also needs to incept and decrypt information regarding terroristic threats.194  
The Israeli government decided to solve its own “crypto wars” by 
implementing specific domestic encryption licensing methods.195  Under 
Israel’s 1957 Control of Commodities and Services Law, the Israeli Minister 
of Defense created an encryption-control licensing regime in 1974.196  Under 
this encryption policy, Israel “aims to balance between national security 
interests on the one hand and preserving competitive Hi-tech Industry on the 
other, whilst enabling users to engage in encryption without over-burdening 
restrictions.”197 
The licensing scheme has three levels: a general license, a restricted 
license, and a special license.198  Each level has its own requirements that an 
applicant must meet to receive the license.199  When a company wants to 
produce a new encryption product, the company must submit an application 
 
 193  See infra Part V.B. 
 194  Matthew Waxman & Doron Hindin, How Does Israel Regulate Encryption?, 
LAWFARE BLOG (Nov. 30, 2015, 9:11 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/how-does-israel-
regulate-encryption. 
 195  Id. 
 196  Id. 
 197  Encryption Policy, MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, http://www.mod.gov.il/English/Encryption
_Controls/Pages/Encryption_Policy.aspx (last visited Sept. 26, 2017).  
 198   See GOLUMBIC, supra note 71, at 130–31; see also Encryption Control in Israel, 
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, http://www.mod.gov.il/English/Encryption_Controls/Pages/def
ault.aspx (last visited Sept. 26, 2017).  The general license is granted for all types of 
encryption engagements, “with the exceptions of modification and integration.”  GOLUMBIC, 
supra note 71, at 131; see also Encryption Control in Israel, MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, 
http://www.mod.gov.il/English/Encryption_Controls/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Sept. 
26, 2017).  A general license has no time limit.  See also Encryption Control in Israel, 
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, http://www.mod.gov.il/English/Encryption_Controls/Pages/def
ault.aspx (last visited Sept. 26, 2017).  Limited licenses, or restricted licenses, are more 
restricted and granted only for “certain types of encryption measures and for certain 
destination countries, based on criteria such as type of user.”  GOLUMBIC, supra note 71, at 
131; see also Encryption Control in Israel, MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, 
http://www.mod.gov.il/English/Encryption_Controls/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Sept. 
26, 2017).  Restricted licenses are valid only for one year.  Encryption Control in Israel, 
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, http://www.mod.gov.il/English/Encryption_Controls/Pages/defau
lt.aspx (last visited Sept. 26, 2017).  Special licenses are issued only for a certain form of 
encryption engagement and are also valid only for one year.  See GOLUMBIC, supra note 71, 
at 131; see also Encryption Control in Israel, MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, http://www
.mod.gov.il/English/Encryption_Controls/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Sept. 26, 2017). 
 199  Encryption Control in Israel, supra note 198. 
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to the Supervisor of Military Export Controls in the Ministry of Defense to 
receive the necessary license for the development of the encryption 
measures.200  Once the encryption measures have been developed, an 
applicant must also apply for an additional license for the production, export, 
or sale of the encryption product.201  Throughout this process, the Ministry 
may request information from the applicant, including a “working” version 
of the product.202  The product is then either approved or rejected for a 
license.203  Further, the license may not be infinite and when it expires, the 
encryption developer must apply for a renewal.204 
Israel’s current licensing system was updated in 1998, and the amended 
language allows Israel to incorporate modern technology.205  The amended 
language also contains a “Free Means” exemption, which allows for certain 
encryption products to be decontrolled.206  Further, an “Internal Use” rule 
allows for a company or individual to use encryption products without a 
license for intra-company purposes.207  The Ministry of Defense also issued 
a policy update in 2001, which relaxed some policy requirements such as 
exempting certain license holders from saving sales data.208 
By having this flexible system, Israel fosters open communication 
between the private and public sectors.209  The Israeli government and its law 
enforcement are constantly apprised of encryption advances.210  If the 
government identifies new encryption technology that may threaten national 
security or law enforcement, the program’s information-sharing scheme 
allows the tech companies and the government to cooperate and reach 
possible solutions and compromises.211  To date, no known law enforcement 
action has taken place concerning violations of the encryption controls.212  
Yet, this system seems to work since major technology companies, including 
 
 200  See GOLUMBIC, supra note 71, at 132. 
 201  Id. 
 202  Id; see also Encryption Policy, supra note 197 (“[T]he applicant will be required to 
submit to the Ministry of Defense the necessary technical information and/or a sample of the 
product and/or any necessary additional information for completing the technical review.”).  
 203  See GOLUMBIC, supra note 71, at 132. 
 204  Id. 
 205  Id. at 128. 
 206  Waxman & Hindin, supra note 194.  See also Free Means, MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, 
http://www.mod.gov.il/English/Encryption_Controls/Pages/FreeMeans.aspx (last visited 
Sept. 26, 2017) (“Any Encryption Item that has received a general licence [sic] is declared a 
‘“Free means’”, and as such requires no further licence [sic].”). 
 207  Waxman & Hindin, supra note 194. 
 208  Encryption Policy, supra note 197. 
 209  Waxman & Hindin, supra note 194. 
 210  Id. 
 211  Id. 
 212  Id. 
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Apple, continue to comply and submit to the Israeli licensing system.213  
According to available statistics, denials of licenses for encryption in Israel 
are also rare and the average time for processing an application is a few days, 
which further demonstrates the cooperation between the Israeli government 
and technology companies.214  Israel’s encryption regulation reflects 
encryption’s dual use nature215 by balancing between individual privacy and 
national security.216 
Israel faces similar threats of terrorism217 and public safety, but also 
values user privacy. Israel’s regulation provides a good example of how to 
balance competing interests within the United States.  A study of Israel’s 
encryption regulations may help the Commission and Congress develop their 
own plans to develop encryption regulation within the United States.  A 
commission like that proposed by the Digital Security Commission Act is 
the first step to foster a dialogue between tech companies and the United 
States government.  Commissions, however, are limited in duration.218  On 
the other hand, if Congress legislated a licensing scheme similar to Israel’s, 
the federal government could continue the open dialogue between the tech 
industry and law enforcement.219  This persistent engagement would not only 
lead to less animosity between the two entities, but would also create 
solutions that would allow law enforcement to receive assistance regarding 
encrypted information. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Although Farook’s iPhone has faded from the spotlight, the controversy 
surrounding stronger private encryption products remains, and the FBI and 
Apple continue to face legal battles.220  The American public and Congress 
 
 213  Id. 
 214  Statistics, MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, http://www.mod.gov.il/English/Encryption_Cont
rols/Pages/Statistics.aspx (last visited Sept. 26, 2017).  
 215  See supra note 102, and accompanying text. 
 216  GOLUMBIC, supra note 71, at 130. 
 217  Waxman & Hindin, supra note 194. 
 218  The Commission was projected to be a year long.  See HOMELAND SEC. REP., supra 
note 101, at 4. 
 219  Similarly, in India, the Observer Research Foundation, a public policy think-tank, 
proposed a licensing scheme like Israel’s as an encryption policy due to the cooperative 
exchange of information such a scheme offers.  Bedavyasa Mohanty, Encryption Policy 2.0: 
Securing India’’s Digital Economy, ORF SPECIAL REPORT 4 (2017), http://cf.orfonline.org/wp
-content/uploads/2017/05/ORF_SpecialReport_35.pdf.  
 220  The FBI recently sought to unlock an iPhone used by Dahir Ada, a terrorist that 
committed a mass stabbing in a Minnesota Shopping Mall.  Joe Uchill, FBI, Apple Eye New 
Fight over Encryption, THE HILL (Oct. 10, 2016, 6:00 AM), http://thehill.com/policy/cy
bersecurity/299853-fbi-apple-eye-new-fight-over-encryption; Amy Forliti, FBI Still Trying to 
Establish Motive in St. Cloud Mall Stabbing, TWIN CITIES (Feb. 17, 2017), http://www.twi
ncities.com/2017/02/17/fbi-still-trying-to-establish-motive-in-st-cloud-mall-stabbing/. 
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must not forget the dueling interests that are at stake with encryption: 
individual privacy and security, and national security and law enforcement 
investigations.  Instead of fighting a war, the federal government and private 
sector companies should call a truce.  By following a model like that 
currently employed in Israel, an open discussion between the technology 
sector and law enforcement can produce new solutions to old problems faced 
by law enforcement.221  Until Congress provides the judiciary with clear 
guidance, courts will continue to struggle to apply outdated legislation on 
ever-increasingly powerful encryption technology to aid law enforcement.  
After battling for years, the time has come for law enforcement and the 
private sector to come together in a dialogue and create a legal scheme to 
provide law enforcement with the assistance it so desperately needs. 
 
 
 221  Although encryption technology has evolved, the United States has struggled since the 
1990s with solutions for regulating encryption.  See supra Part III.B and accompanying text.   
